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The Narodniki: Russian populists, adherents of an agrarian socialist movement active from the 1860s to the 
end of the 19'' century. Influenced by the writings of Alexander Herzen the narodniki attempted to adapt 
socialist doctrine to Russian conditions; they envisaged a society in which sovereignty would rest with small 
self-governing economic units resembling the traditional Russian village commune and held together in a 
loose voluntary confederation replacing the state. The narodniki first went to the villages in 1874 to spread 
their doctrine among the peasants, but they were rejected. In 1876 they formed a secret society, known as 
Land and Liberty, to promote a mass revolutionary uprising. Expelled from the countryside by the police, 
they soon became dominated by the movement's terroristic wing, the People's Will, formed in 1879, which 
undertook several political assassinations; in 1881 a member of the group assassinated Czar Alexander II. 
Thereafter populism declined. In 1901 the Socialist Revolutionary party was founded as the heir to the 
narodniki movement. 
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LANDING THE MIDDLE PEASANTRY: NARODISM IN TANZANIA 
By Susanne D. Mueller 
Tanzania: Narodism and the Articulation of the Modes of Production 
To accuse an African ruling class of retarding capitalism and its principal 
classes is virtually unheard of. However, this is what has ha.ppened in Tanzania, 
·where state capital has consistently acted to forestall the development of 
a bourgeoisie and a proletariat by basing accumulation on the expansion of 
middle peasant household production, The reactionary utopianism of Russia's 
Narodniks has actually been institutionalized here and labelled socialism. 
Lenin's predictions have come true; labor and capital have been confined to their 
most primitive state, and middle peasants are increasingly squeezed as the state 
intensifies the production of cash crops which demand more inputs and must 
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conform to rigid quality and quantity controls. From the perspective of the 
market, middle peasants are expected to act like capitalists while constrained 
by both their smallness and their lack of capital, and like labor without any 
of the benefits of fully socialized labor. With the'intensification of commodity 
production, middle peasants are simulataneously subject to all the horrors of 
producing for an increasingly demanding market and none of the benefits of 
capitalism over previous modes of production. By forestalling "the direct sep-
aration of household producers from their means of production," the state has 
fettered "the accumulation of indigenous capital within smallholding production." 2 
(Cowen, 1977: 4.) This fettering plus the continuous expansion of smallholdings 
forecloses the possibility of significantly developing the productive forces. 
The result is overwork and underconsumption, the continuation of hand production, 
and the reassertion· of backward, semifeudal relations of production as middle 
peasant producers who are unable to reproduce themselves under these conditions 
become informal tenants for others and whole families (including children) become 
part of this overworked and underfed work force. 
In theory, the enormous injection of international capital in Tanzania 
since 1974 should counteract the regressive effects of Narodism. In contrast 
to state capital, international capital enters as the advanced capital of a 
different form and period, acting to rationalize commodity production and to 
raise the productivity of labor through improved inputs and higher producer 
prices. 3 However, international capital (like all other capitals, as Marx noted) 
initially takes labor as it finds it and only later transforms it. By entering 
on the back of a state capital that has organized labor within a Narodnik frame-
work, international capital is itself limited by the contradictions of attempting 
to transform the value of labor power within this framework. Consequently, 
improved inputs are used which theoretically increase the value produced by labor, 
but extraction on the basis of absolute rather than relative surplus value still 
predominates, as the formal and real subordination of labor to capital is in-
hibited by the confines of middle peasant household production. Improved seeds, 
insecticides, and fertilizers are either counterbalanced by the effect of the 
hand hoe or demand more labor than can be supplied by a household which is too 
poor to hire in. Smallholdings limit the degree of mechanization, resulting in 
outcries for so-called "appropriate technologies" to stabilize Narodism in the 
fact of its contradictions. 
As Lenin and Kautsky predicted, the middle peasant's land becomes his fetter 
under such circumstances. The formality of the land may mask his "precarious 
position" of "half peasant/half worker" (Lenin, I, p. 223), his eventual prole-
tarianization, and his interim st!ltus of "wage labor equivalent" (Banaji, 1977: 
33-34). However, once the laws of motion of capital predominate and become 
generalized, the middle peasantry is compelled "to expand commodity production 
to reproduce the means of subsistence," (Cowen, NCCHP: 19) and it is this com-
pulsion which determines its status. 
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The question of why the middle peasant's land in Tanzania has become his 
fetter is not to be answered by referring to some mythically resilient pre-
capitalist peasantry. The middle peasantry is not p,recapitalist. It has been 
subjected to the laws of motion of capitalism and none of its progressive benefits. 
Its fetter is not itself, but the state which has legally restricted its freedom 
of movement, confined it to villages, and reintroduced minimum acreage require-
ments from the thirties. (Raikes, 1975, 1978; Coulson, 1975, 1977). Capital 
at the level of exchange is not articulating with some mysterious preeapitalist 
mode of production. The laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production 
predominate with labor chained by the state to the most backward organization of 
production, the most primitive productive forces, and thereby forced into the 
most primitive relations of production. The authority comes from capital. The 
limitations derive from the state and not a resistant precapitalist formation. 
To understand why capitalism is still so poorly developed and the reasons for 
the limitations on formal and real subordination that effectively institutionalize 
Narodism and pauperize a trapped middle peasantry, one must look to the state 
and its ruling class as the resistant class rather than to some resistant pre-
capitalist formation. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the class itself 
is not precapitalist but capitalist and petit-bourgeois. As such, the state 
is not against capitalism per se, but simply big capitalism out of its control 
as opposed to small capitalism within its control. 
Why Narodism Became the Tanzanian Way 
In Kenya, a nascent big bourgeoisie controlled politics as early as the 
1930s, while in Tanzania, teachers, traders, and clerks were the mainstay of the 
independence movement, with kulak farmers participating (Awiti, Bienen, Hyden, 
Maguire), but never predominating as a class "to the extent where they could 
become an important political force at the national level" (Shivji, 1976: 50 ): 
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5 In contrast to Kenya, Tanzania was not a settler colony and had a lower priority 
for Great Britain. This junior status was reflected by its comparatively under-
developed infrastructure, industrial and manufacturing sectors at independence 
in 1961. 6 Europeans in Tanzania alienated less than 1 per cent of the land, 
few restrictions were placed on what Africans were allowed to grow, and the official 
policy was to promote cash crop production by expanding middle peasant household 
producers (Brett: 217;Iliffe, 1971: 36-37 ), Proletarianization was minimal 
by comparison with Kenya, where the imposition of settler estate agriculture 
often necessitated separating the producer from his means of production, resulting 
in landlessness. 7 Unlike Kenya, where a future big bourgeoisie berated the colonial 
state for being "communist" (Njonjo) and not differentiating between them and 
the rest by allowing the "better farmers" to plant coffee and have individual 
title to the land, 8ranzania's kulaks did not face the same impediments and were 
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perhaps less insistent about controlling the independence movement. Although 
Kenya's nascent big bourgeoisie found its sphere of operation circumscribed by 
the colonial state, capital invested relatively heavily in this settler colony, 
creating ample opportunities to accumulate through trade and distributorships 
as well as by producing agricultural commodities which were less attractive to 
settler capital. Because Tanzania was, from the earliest times, a dumping 
ground for Kenya's developing industrial and manufacturing sector, opportunities 
for accumulation were more limited in Tanzania ~nd a nonproductive petit bour-
geoisie predominated, with only a small number of kulak farmers emerging in 
the fertile areas of Kilimanjaro, Ismani, and Lushoto, alongside the European 
estates. These "yeoman" farmers, as they were called, were not favored by the 
colonial state against the "peasant cultivator" until the mid-1950s when the 
state attempted to encourage "'the transition from native customary tenure into 
freehold in appropriate areas "' (Iliffe, 1971: 38 ), By this time, the 
independence movement was in full swing and this policy, which clearly acted 
to stabilize kulaks as a class, was roundly attacked by Nyerere, who claimed: 
If we allowed land to be sold like a robe, within a short 
period there would only be a few Africans possessing land 
in Tanzania .... We would be faced with a problem which has 
created antagonism among people and led to bloodshed in many 
countries of the world (Nyerere in Iliffe, 1971: 38) 0 
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Kenya's big b.ourgeoisie came to power to strip capital of its racial fetters and 
proceeded to smash its petit bourgeois opponents who saw the situation somewhat 
differently. Tanzania's ruling "bureaucratic bourgeoisie," as it was later called 
(Shivji, 1976: 9 66-99) , lacked the material base to act like its Kenya coun-
terparts and was not prepared to continue to support land policies that would 
develop capital (out of its control) and proletarianize a middle peasantry. 
Hence, while Kenya devised policies to support the further development of a big 
bourgeoisie, 10 its poorer sister "chose" Narodism to institutionalize a petit 
bourgeoisie and small capitalism. 
Narodism Phase I: Ujamaa 
Tanzania's Narodism has developed in two phases (1967-1973 and 1973-present) 
with tendencies to reproduce two different forms and periods of capital. 
During the first phase, Nyerere presented his version of "socialism,'.' attempted 
to institutionalize it in the now famous "ujamaa" (familyhood) villages, and 
began his attack on big capital. 
Socialism, Nyerere argued, was "an attitude of mind," and the immediate task 
after independence was for Tanzanians to "reeducate" themselves and "regain 
(this) former attitude of mind " (Nyerere in Clark, 1978: 42 ), Capitalism, 
exploitation, classes and class struggle were all presented as the unique product 
of a foreign, Western colonialism, rather than as a distinct period in the devel-
opment of commodity production. Nyerere therefore insisted that Tanzania's task 
was to become "self-reliant" and to develop its traditional economy, which was 
already socialistic (Nyerere, 1968: 337-356; 1966: 195-203 ). 
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The argument was not new. Almost one hundred years earlier Lenin spent 
volumes attacking Russia's Narodniks who believed that socialism there could 
be based on the mir (village commune) and its naturally communistic peasantry 
(Lenin, I-IV especially). Lenin saw the Narodniks as utopian, petit bourgeois 
reactionary nationalists whose support of Russia's "small producer" was "opposed 
to the interests of labour in general" and was not an attack on capitalism, but 
simply big foreign capital (Lenin, I: 440-441 ). Lenin roundly chastised 
the Narodniks for inventing "a fiction of the pre-capitalist order" (Lenin, 
II: 517 ), for their false assumption that Russia was still "pre-capitalist" 
(Lenin, I: 384-385), and for their insistence on incorrectly seeing the Russian 
small producer as an independent proto-socialist rather than as a petit bourgeois 
engaged in the hopeless task of trying to stabilize himself as a small producer 
in the face of a developing capitalist economy" (Lenin, I: 341-381 ). To prefer 
capitalism in its "least developed" form, where both labor and capital are back-
ward, was in Lenin's opinion to prefer capitalism in its "worst form" (Lenin, 
I: 436 ). In designating "independent undertakings, 11 which depended on all sorts 
of personal exploitation, moral, and "wage labour," which stripped "exploitation 
of all its obscurities and illusions" immoral (Lenin, I: 384-385 ), Lenin 
accused the Narodniks of opting for "stagnation" over "capitalist progress" 
(Lenin, II: 519), and of fettering labor to the land rather than pressing 
for its freedom as a socialized commodity off the land, where it would be capable 
of confronting capital in its most advanced form (Lenin, I: 414 ). 
In spite of its historical antecedents, Nyerere's radical populism had an 
initially strong domestic appeal and even more so abroad. Intrinsic to its 
success was the argument that socialism could develop apart from classes and class 
struggle, that everything could be improved without drastic change, that the 
peasantry was the "natural fighter for socialism" (Lenin, I: 275) and that so-
called traditional life would be preserved rather than destroyed. Even now, 
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critics attacking the results of Tanzania's policies tend to defend the theory 
and/or the class behind these policies as "progressive" (Shivji, 1976: 98; 
Saul, 1974: 362; van Freyhold, 1977: 85; Raikes, 1975: 36; Raikes, 1978: 
269) with alternative positions branded "pseudo-Marxist determinism" (Saul, 
1974: 364 ). The historical analogue appears once again with reminders of 
Lenin's attacks on Narodnik reformism, their belief that Russia was "exceptional" 
(Lenin, II: 518) and their underlying assumption that they, as intellectuals, 
could choose Russia's future apart from "the independent trends of the various 
social classes which were shaping history in accordance with their own 
interests" (Lenin, II: 523 ). 
Irrespective of the support it garnered from intellectuals and its own 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the Narodnik content of Tanzania's policies in this 
first phase was obvious enough. After repeated failures to attract foreign 
aid, the 1967 Arusha Declaration announced Tanzania would base its socialism 
on "self-reliance" at both the national and individual level. Banks, large 
companies, and big private estates were nationalized, with less than half of 
the transport and manufacturing sector left in private hands (Clark, 1978: 
68 ), Shortly afterwards, the political party TANU passed a set of "Leader-
ship Guidelines" which prohibited members of the government, party and para-
statals from holding more than one job, having directorships or shares in 
private companies, or from renting private houses to others. The agrarian 
policy was spelled out in two position papers: "Socialism and Rural Develop-
ment," and "Education for Self-Reliance." In the former, the state encouraged 
peasants to join ujamaa villages and farm communally in exchange for promises 
of increased social services. In the latter, proposals were made to dismantle 
the colonial educational structure and include agricultural work as part of 
the primary school curriculum so that peasant children would be prepared for 
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their future with a realistic, relevant education. Somewhat afterwards, in 
1971, TANU's "Mwongozo" Guidelines theoretically opened the way for workers' 
participation and control by forbidding "arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous 
and oppressive leaders" (Clark, 1978: 48 ), 
A 
Different classes in different parts of the country handled these pro-
mulgations differently; 11 however, it would be a mistake to treat them as mere 
theory. The attack was against big capital and the development of wage labor 
as a commodity. The effect was to level class formation and simultaneously 
to introduce the more perverse sorts of differentiation predicted by Lenin. 
With state employees prohibited from engaging in private enterprise, personal 
accumulation did not stop, but depended on surreptitious business activities 
that were often unproductive (Shivji, 1976: 80-84; Raikes, 1978: 301-307;· 
Fortmann, 1978c: 20) and on increasing the size of the state bureaucracy and 
the salaries of its upper echelons. In spite of the "Mwongozo" Guidelines, 
the state clamped down hard on workers after a series of strikes in 1972-1973 
(Mihyo, 1975: 64-84; Shivji, 1976: 23-45) revealing the anti-labor petit 
bourgeois content of its socialism. With capital itself formally stymied, the 
size of the official working class also decreased (Raikes, 1978), in part the 
result of a cutback in sisal production (Rweyemamu; Clark, 1978: 55 ), in 
part a predictable consequence ohNarodism. Furthermore, "Education for Self-
Reliance" appeared to apply only to the poor as differentiation continued 
(Mbilinyi, 1974; 1976) and other classes went on for secondary and university 
studies. 
In the agrarian sector, this first phase attempted to halt the development 
of a politically and economically competitive class of capitalist farmers 
and to exert greater control over the sphere of realization by encouraging 
communal production in ujamaa villages. Producer prices for agricultural 
commodities barely changed over a seven-year period, one example of state 
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appropriation by unequal exchange. Another was its tendency to mimic merchant 
capital as it simultaneously entered the sphere of production sporadically 
and unevenly without transforming the productive forces, without decreasing 
the value of labor power and by appropriating through the extraction of 
absolute surplus value (Boesen, b; Coulson, 1975; Raikes, 1975; Shivji ). 
Hence the predictable attempts by the ruling class to idealize the land, the 
village, and the hoe. 
Kulak farmers responded in kind. Living in the most productive parts 
of the country on the periphery, they reacted by selling across the border to 
neighboring Kenya and Uganda, where producer prices where often higher and the 
shilling was harder, following the dissolution of the unified East African 
currency in 1966. Kulaks also used their control of the cooperative societies, 
through which credit was distributed and crops were marketed, to accumulate 
at the expense of both smallholders and the state (Raikes, 1978: 301-307; 
Migot Agolla in Widstrand; Fortmann, 1978c: 20; Cliffe et. al., 1975; Matango) 
and even managed on occasion to attract state resources to establish "ujamaa" 
villages (von Freyhold, 1977: 88; Raikes, 1975: 45-46 ). While the re-
lationship between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and individual kulaks remained 
somewhat ambiguous, the official policy of expanding middle peasant household 
production fettered their ability to accumulate as a class. The thrust of 
the state's policies attempted to stymie the development of a class of com-
petitive appropriators. Although the state might favor individual kulaks from 
time to time, as a class they became the scapegoat for the state's failures 
and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie mounted attacks on those farmers ,who could 
potentially become "a focus of opposition aginst measures which affected the 
peasantry as a whole" (von Freyhold, 1977: 88 ). 
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During this period, ujamaa villages were voluntary and kulak famers 
rarely joined with the exception of those who used the opportunity to attract 
state funds. Ujamaa villages were directed towards poor peasants; however, 
the much promised social services rarely came, no more than 15 to 20 percent 
of the population ever joined, efforts to promote communal production were 
generally unsuccessful, and active political participation was discouraged to 
the point where one group of villages known as the Ruvuma Development Association 
was deregistered and banned (McHenry; Coulson, 1975; Raikes, 1975; Fortmann, 
1978c). Although recruitment into villages was supposed to be voluntary, 
force was often used to relocate peasants to sites where there was no water, 
no seeds for planting, no food during the relocation period, and where the land 
itself was JX)or, medical facilities were unavailable, and the lengthy distance 
from the market made it impossible to sell what was produced. Furthemore, 
with wage labor officially prohibited or discouraged, more perverse social 
relations of production appeared (Musoke, Bakula, Daraja, Mashauri, Mboya 
in Proctor.) Leaders often had more land than others, penalized those who 
refused to work on communal plots, and used the labor power within villages 
as their personal servants (Proctor; Fortmann, 1978c: 42~43.) 
In short, the prohibitions on wage labor simply resurrected the various 
types of corvee labor described so well by Lenin in his critiques of the 
Narodniks (Lenin, DCR: 189, 605; Lenin, I: 216-217 ). While estate laborers 
had been relatively better off, as they were protected by a mimimum wage 
(Fortmann, 1978b: 3), one Area Commissioner prohibited members of an ujamaa 
village from working in a nearby tea factory (de Vries and Fortmann, 1974: 15), 
and in another case the hiring of migrant wage labor was stopped. In Ismani, 
after capitalist famers had their land appropriated and turned.into ujamaa 
villages, the state used and "directed" the labor of secondary school children 
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and members of the National Service (Raikes, 1977: 306, 322) in preference 
to wage labor. In a village in Tanga, members became the "personal servants" 
of the manager and were punished with double work loads if they did not perform 
the communal work assigned to them (Fortmann, 1978c: 42-43). Not surprisingly, 
ttlabour organization" was often perceived as "problematic" during this period. 
However, the resistance of the peasantry could not be termed precapitalist. 
Given the choice between "ujamaa and working as a paid labourer, they chose 
the cash" (De Vries and Fortmann, 1974: 15); however, often the choice was 
not theirs. Decisions stemmed from the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that an "idle 
and loitering" poor peasantry "should be participating full time in agricultural 
production" (Boesen, b: 6) for the state. Predictably enough, with labor ex-
ploited by the state both in the sphere of realization and exchange, agricul-
tural production declined. Furthermore, the failures of this period were 
not the unfortunate mistakes of a "well-intentioned" (Raikes, 1978: 269) 
socialism, but the predictable consequences of Narodism, which is aQ.ti-labor 
and reactionary where it appears. As Lenin noted, 
compared with the labour of the dependent or bonded peasant, 
the labour of the hired worker is progressive in all branches 
of the national economy (Lenin, DCR: 605.). 
Not a single worker would ever consent to exchange his 
status for that of a Russian "independent" handicraftsman 
in "real," "peoples" industries (Lenin,. I: 216-217), 
or, one might add, with a member of an ujamaa village. 
The result by 1974 was stagnation in agriculture (Tabari, 1975: 90 ). 
With so few peasants in ujamaa villages and cooperatives still holding their 
own, state capital still had little control either in the sphere of production 
or exchange. Outside of a few estates, the productive forces were still 
underdeveloped to the point of being backward (Boesen, b: 10, 7), inputs were 
not widely used, and surplus was largely appropriated on the basis of absolute 
rather than relative surplus value. With agricultural commodities forming 
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one half of Tanzania's GDP and almost all of her exports, the consequences of a 
stagnating agrarian sector could not be overlooked. Peasants had to be kept 
on the land and producing to support a burgeoning state and insure its repro-
duction. The anti-proletarian content of Narodism was likely to become starker. 
The state needed to harness the labor power of the peasantry without creating 
surplus populations that "could not possibly be absorbed" (Marx, Capital, I: 
734). Furthermore, state capital itself was too po-orly developed to support 
a large proletariat and was unwilling to allow a competitive capitalist class 
to accumulate at its expense. 
Narodism Phase II: Villagization 
Faced with these crises, Tanzania embarked on a second phase characterized 
by the forcible villagization of the majority of the population and a massive 
reentry of international (mainly World Bank) capital of a different form and 
period. Villagization had its greatest impact on weak and scattered populations 
in the poorest parts of the country. Here labor was uprooted and regrouped 
into legally constituted villages. Villagization is best understood as the 
initial crude reorganization of labor; as the formal subordination of labor 
to state capital. As such, it has more in common with Marx's description of 
early capitalism prior to mechanization 12 (Marx, Capital I: chapters XI-XIV, 
especially p. 322) than it does with the expansion of simple commodity production 
within the confines of a so-called "peasant economy." What has been described 
as the "Resiliance of the Peasant Mode of Production" (Hyden, 1978) exists 
only in the realm of mythology. 
While the ideology of ujamaa was projected as a kind of sentimental 
Narodism, villagization was presented in terms of modernization theory. Peasants 
were no longer seen as proto-socialist, but as thorns in the state's side, whose 
"problems were based fundamentally on their traditional outlook and 
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unwillingness to accept change," Ideologues argued "the state had •.. to take 
the role of the 'father'" and move its citizens to "a better and more pros-
perous life" (Mwapachu, 1976: 3), In 1973, Nyerere announced that "to live 
in villages is an order," and justified coercion by a further notation that 
"It's partly compulsory ... so is vaccination." (quoted in Nsari, 197 5: 116 ). 
From the standpoint of the state, the main objective of villagization was 
to make possible a better use of the existent and often 
underemployed rural labour. By working together, ... 
peasants are expected to engage in specialization of 
functions and divisions of labour as well as increase 
their work and discipline. It is hoped that this together 
with the emanating village organization would eventually 
lead to an increase in agricultural production and labour 
productivity (Maeda, 1977: 6). 
One could hardly have asked for a better rendition of chapters XI-XIV of 
Marx's Capital, I. 
The state instituted its,policy of forcible villagization between 1973 
and 1976. Communal production was largely abandoned and 13 million people 
were herded into nucleated villages with individual block farms, representing 
85 per cent of the population and some 8,000 villages (Coulson, 1977), 
Regardless of intention, the initial impact of villagization was not to produce 
primitive rural factories of organized labor. It was instead to radically 
disrupt rural life and to create a food crisis. 13 Government agents who 
ranged from the militia to TANU youth league officials to agricultural extension 
officers stripped peasants of their land, food, and possessions, burning their 
houses and crops along the way. Scattered populations were moved, in many 
cases from fertile to barren land, out of permanent dwellings, away from water, 
and to areas devoid of social services. Populations which had once been 
scattered were now concentrated. Ecologically sound land practices were 
dismantled. Land that was formerly cleared and kept under control through 
scattered dwelling patterns returned to bush. Villages were overpopulated 
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and overconcentrated. Land began to erode under the pressure of too 
many animals and people, with sanitary conditions deteriorating rapidly. 
Whereas a farmer's field had once been close by his dwelling, the concentration 
of populations into nucleated villages now sometimes meant a five-to seven-
mile walk prior to cultivating. Much of that land either returned to bush 
or, when it was farmed, was too far away to be protected from devastation by 
wild animals, bad weather, pilfering, etc. Consequently, a kind of illegal 
feudal subtenancy occurred with farmers who had land closer to the village 
subletting to those who had land further away, thereby creating "a previously 
nonexistent landlord class" (Fortmann, 1978c: 56). Villages were arbitrarily 
located near roads even when it was the least fertile land in the area. In 
practice, this meant that in some areas peasants were forcibly evicted from 
fertile hilltops to barren plains or vice versa depending on where the road 
was. The result in one instance,wasa 50 percent decline in agricultural 
production (Operation Songeza, p. 6). Tanzania, which had been a net exporter 
of food between 1968 and 1971, was forced to import over 500,000 tons of maize 
between 1973 and 1975 to avert starvation (Lofchie, 1978: 453-455). 
At the same time that villagization was occurring, the state restructured 
its authority to deal with these new units of production. Freedom of move-
ment was curtailed and mimimum acreage requirements from the colonial period 
were introduced. Prior to the massive move, Government was decentralized to 
the Regions in 1972 with a heavy concentration of administrative and legal 
authority directed to villages and village production. A hierarchy of com-
mand was established from the Prime Minister's Office (PMO's) to the vill,igs>, 
and agricultural extension officers (bwana shambas) were only to report to 
the Ministry of Agriculture on technical matters, with the administrative 
authority (i.e. promotions, hiring, firing, orders) transferred to the PMO. 
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In 1975, the "Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Resignation, Designation and 
Administration) Act" was passed to define what constituted a village and how 
its political and administrative affairs should be regulated. Village Chair-
men and Secretaries became paid employees of the political party and assumed 
a greater responsibility for agricultural production at the village level. 
In 1976, co-operative societies were disbanded with agricultural credit 
(i.e. applying for, receiving, onlending, and recouping credit for improved 
inputs) and crop buying arrangements filtered through the village as the legally 
liable unit, thereby eliminating the role previously enjoyed by kulak farmers. 
Parastatal crop-buying and marketing authorities were simultaneously established 
foralmost every crop, again curtailing the kulak sphere of influence in an 
attempt to increase state accumulation. A year later, the political party 
TANU joined with Zanzibar's ASP to become CCM (Chama Cha Mapi,,itduzi - the 
Party of the Revolution). With its new radical nomenclature, the party role 
nevertheless increasingly came to resemble that of the state's policeman 
in the countryside, as it assumed a greater responsibility for agricultural 
prcduction and the distribution of credit at the village level. However, the 
state decided not to leave village production to popularly elected officials 
and in December 1977 created the post of Village Manager (VM) and Village 
Management Technician (VMT) who were to be paid and accountable to the central 
government and responsible for the "socio-economic take-off of the village 
as a production unit" (Maeda, p. 11). The position has been accurately de-
scribed as "the final stage of government penetration of the countryside" 
(Fortmann, 1978b: 19). However, with villages regarded by state officials 
as a kind of Siberia, few have reported for duty. 
One must naturally distinguish between the state's vision and attempts 
at subordination and the reality which followed. Although in certain respects, 
villagization as a classic form represented the "enlargement of scale" (Mandel, 
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1977: 1023) which Marx felt was critical to greater formal and hence real 
subordination, the degree of formal subordination itself varied, creating 
various types of villages. Furthermore, even within classic nucleated villages, 
household production remains the dominant form, with the state doing little 
beyond supplying inputs to transform the value of labor power. The result 
in both cases is that there is a limit to the degree of subordination which 
can occur, thereby accentuating extraction by absolute surplus value, giving 
rise to the Narodism of an earlier period, and leading to certain contra-
dictions for both state and international capital. 
In the wealthy,densely populated, richer parts of the country, villages 
are often nothing more than legal composites of individual landholdings 
which are still scattered, sometimes unconsolidated,and cannot be visibly 
identified as villages. Following the assassination of a state official who 
tried to villagize the wealthy maize growers of Ismani, the state made no 
further attempt to move capitalist farmers and reorganize their production. 
Instead, the state's legal redefinition of these unconsolidated holdings as 
villages was directed towards subordinating the sphere of exchange by making 
it impossible for individual farmers to receive agricultural inputs outside 
of their village governments and making these governments the legally liable 
organs if they fail to recoup credit. Nevertheless, the state's policy of 
expanding household production and officially frowning on the hiring of wage 
labor both increases the difficulty of accumulating and concentrating rural 
capital and the likelihood that poorer middle peasants (themselves the product 
of the contradictions of Narodism) will be hired informally. 
A second type of village is like the first, atypical, but in a different 
sanse. Its population produces little for exchange value and really approximates 
a rural proletariat rather than the more common middle peasant wage labor 
equivalent -- subordinated to capital, fighting to reproduce itself, and yet 
-17-
unable to sell its labor for the wage versus the equivalent. Such villages 
have little independent economic viability and are most accurately described 
as "bedroom communities" to the large state or expatriate estates which they 
border. A number of such villages are new creations of the massive villagi-
zation campaign. Typically, they have been sited on marginal land with poor 
productive potential; they are not considered creditworthy and produce little 
to nothing for exchange value. It would be difficult to say whether such 
villages are the result of bad planning or a strategic way of providing cheap 
labor for nearby estates. In the past, a number of attempts were made to 
recruit labor for state farms. When that failed, vagrants in town who could 
not show they had work were forcibly moved and trucked out to government 
estates. As most of the vagrants ran away, a more successful policy has been 
to relocate the peasantry to uninhabitable land, control movement between 
villages, and create a captive labor force. 
A third type of village is also marginal, but unlike the second, there 
is no way the population can engage in ·wage labor. Here, the middle peasantry 
is experiencing the classic symptoms of Narodism and stands with "one foot 
already in the swamp of pauperism" (Marx, Capital, I: 642 ). The population 
is too far away from the estates to sell its labor, too likely to be evicted 
rom the towns if it tried, and too uneducated to succeed if they were not 
thrown out. The biggest problem of peasants in such villages is to ensure 
their own continuous reproduction -- that is, to produce enough to eat. 
Normally, they grow two seasons of maize before they sell any because they 
fear starvation. As they generally have been relocated to uninhabitable land, 
theirsurplus is marginal, and they are no longer considered suitable credit 
risks. To the extent that freedom of movement has been curtailed by vil-
lagization (and it is unclear how successful the state has been in its attempts 
to restrict migration), the land is likely to become increasingly marginal, 
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leading to a situation in which poor middle peasants are less and less likely 
to be able to reproduce themselves. At present, these villages produce very 
little and sometimes nothing for exchange value. Hence, the essential condi-
tion which prompted capital to provide famine relief during the colonial 
period (Bryceson) -- to ensure the continuous production for exchange value 
does not arise. Nevertheless, to avert starvation, the importation of food 
and the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, 14 it is still important to 
the state that such peasants are able to reproduce themselves. State and 
particularly international capital have encouraged the growth of food crops 
through a variety of mechanisms including more favorable producer prices and 
by supplying inputs on credit for the production of food crops through pro-
grams such as the National Maize Programme, which was jointly sponsored by the 
World Bank aµd AID. However, since the crisis of 1974, credit for the produc-
tion of food crops is mainly given where cash crops are produced so that 
necessary labor time relative to surplus labor time will be reduced, thereby 
increasing the productivity of labor power from the standpoint of state capital. 
As these villages neither produce cash crops nor generally for exchange, 
they are by definition not creditworthy. Although credit was given to some 
of these villages experimentally following the food crisis of 1974, the result 
was either that credit was not repaid, or that the land was so marginal that 
the inputs had either no impact or a negative one (Fortmann, 1976). 15 It 
seems then that the continuous reproduction of this peasantry is not important 
for exchange value, but simply to avert starvation and/or the development 
of surplus populations. To ensure both, the state, in conjunction with the 
ILO and the UNDP is proposing to begin a "Special Labour Intensive Public 
Works Programme in the Arusha, Dodoma, Rukwa, and Ruvuma Regions", which 
are some of the poorer parts of the country. The point of this project is 
to "engage deployable surplus labour to build irrigation and water supply 
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facilities, schools, health centres, housing, feeder roads and to carry out 
land reclamation" (UNDP, pp. 27-28 ). Labor power will either be paid below 
its value or compensated by "food for work." One is reminded of the German 
colonial period when 
famine was made into a useful occasion for the 
administration to gain labour for its many "projects 
of civilization'.'. The policy of "quid pro quo" 
was proudly proclaimed: "The governor does not 
intend to distribute the food free of charge, but 
rather to sell it cheaply or to exchange it against 
work performance. He hopes to generate some good 
results from this approach and to considerably in-
crease the contribution of the local people to use-
ful endeavors like road construction" 
(Kjekshus, 1977: 140-141, partially quoted in 
Bryceson, 1978: 17). 
Whatever the initial reasons for moving scattered peasants off one piece 
of marginal land concentrating them on another, it is clear that although these 
peasants produce nothing significant for exchange value, it is far easier 
for the state to subordinate and deploy rural labor from villages than from 
scattered settlements. From the standpoint of state capital, villages have 
many of the same attractions that factories did in comparison to scattered 
handicraft "industries." One is accessible, whereas the other is less so; 
one has functionaries (members of the village government, village managers, 
etc.) whose chief responsibility is to "direct, superintend, and ... adjust" 
(Marx, Capital: I, 330) the work process, whereas the other does not. 
Again, the fact that labor is not fully proletarianized, that it is in some 
sense still tied to the land but unable to reproduce itself off of it, that 
it is paid below its value and subsidizes this low payment by what it produces 
on the land is not the sign of a precapitalist peasantry. This middle pea-
santry is experiencing the classic symptoms of Narodism. It is being squeezed, 
trapped, and exploited by a poorly developed state capital attempting to 
transform itself without creating capitalists, workers, or surplus populations. 
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A fourth type of village has greater productive potential than those 
just described, primarily because of its location on arable land. Such vil-
lages have a special status for state and international capital. They are 
the focus of rural credit and "integrated rural development" schemes and of 
programs to expand the production of certain cash crops. However, even here 
peasants have received few increases in social services and little that would 
transform the quality of the productive forces. While the state views the 
village as a unit of production with stated targets, it has done little but 
to regroup labor. The middle peasant household continues to remain the sub-
unit of production, sometimes scattered, sometimes on individual block farms 
within nucleated villages. The hoe is still the main instrument of production, 
most villages are poorly connected by roads, many have no water, and the quality 
of extension services is often poor (Coulson, 1977). A climate of chronic 
uncertainty faces potentially productive peasants in potentially productive 
villages. A peasant may produce for exchange value only to find that the 
market does not provide for the purchase of use values, raising the obvious 
question of why produce if there is nothing to buy. Crop prices are variable, 
marketing is unreliable, and transport and storage are generally unavailable, 
Crops sometimes rot waiting for the state to market perishable produce, or 
prices suddenly change to the disadvantage of the peasant producer, putting 
him into debt or forcing him to undercomsume. Liberal market incentives are 
too unpredictable to give rise to the degree of specialization in production 
that one might expect. Instead, as a hedge against the state's poor prices 
and marketing, potentially high producers tend to diversify rather than_sDe-
cialize in one commodity and sometimes move more heavily into food production. 
Although special seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, and other improved inputs 
are supplied to such villages, the realization of value still tends towards 
the extraction of absolute rather than relative surplus value, because the 
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productive forces are so backward and their transformation is limited by the 
existing organization of production. With minimum acreage requirements of the 
colonial period having been resurrected and the coercive apparatus of the 
state well developed down to the village, there is little direct confrontation 
of state authority. Instead, peasants engage in activities which are inter-
preted by the state as devious, stupid, uneducated or irrational, which give 
rise, in turn to a further concentration of state authority at the village 
level. These activities are, in fact, the symptoms of Narodism -- the con-
tradictions of attempting to force out an increase in surplus value within 
the confines of middle peasant household production. 
Narodism and International Capital 
This fourth type of village is the focal point for international capital, 
which now supplies Tanzania with 60 to 80 percent of its annual development 
budget. It is directed primarily towards the promotion of certain cash crops 
or institutions and programs which indirectly support that production. Con-
tinuity in production as well as quality and quantity controls are important 
aspects of supplying international markets with particular commodities. Both 
increasingly depend on the expansion and rationalization of commodity relations 
in general. Hence, international capital is promoting projects to improve 
storage facilities for both food and cash crops, devise training programs 
for village officials and agricultural extension officers, start small businesses 
within villages, improve the distribution of fertilizers and other inputs, 
and develop technical packages which are specifically designed to suit certain 
agro-economic zones. 
To insure sufficient quantity and quality controls, it is necessary 
to force out an increase in the productivity of labor by using improved 
inputs. Tendencies towards a further extraction of relative surplus value 
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depend on increasing the size of holdings, the hiring of wage labor, and the 
introduction of machinery, all of which are inhibited by middle peasant house-
hold production, As the use of inputs increases and demands more labor than 
can be supplied by small households, a counter-tendency towards the extraction 
of absolute surplus value appears, in spite of the fact that international 
capital does enter as an advanced form of industrial eapital with tendencies 
to produce higher yields of a specified quality, To insure a continuous 
supply of a commodity, there must in the first instance be a guarantee that 
peasant producers are able to reproduce themselves, In the second instance, 
commodity relations must be sufficiently generalized either to result in the 
ideal situation where producers purchase rather than produce the means of sub-
sistence or where conditions encourage peasants to increase what they produce 
for exchange value and decrease production to reproduce the means of subsis-
tence. To decrease necessary relative to surplus labor time. necessitates 
supplying improved inputs for both food and cash crops, thereby increasing 
yields per hectare, decreasing the amount of land and labor time which must 
be used for production to reproduce the means of subsistence, and increasing 
production for exchange value, whether of food or cash crops. However, within 
the confines of middle peasant household production, the tendency to force 
out an increase in the value of labor (i.e. the extraction of relative surplus 
value) is counteracted by the constraints of household production, resulting 
in a tendency towards the intensification of labor, overwork, and undercon-
sumption, and the extraction of absolute surplus value. This is further 
heightened as producers are paid too poorly (below the socially necessary 
cost of labor) for what they produce for exchange, If they are paid too poorly 
for what they produce for exchange value, they will either go into debt as they 
attempt to pay for inputs received on credit, be unable to reproduce themselves, 
switch from one commodity to another in search of better prices, or attempt 
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to retreat into production for consumption. In all cases, the continuous 
production of commodities for exchange value is thre.atened. Hence, in Kenya, 
according to Cowen, international capital fought against earlier forms of 
capital (in particular, estate capital) in their attempts to "maintain producer 
prices" and sought to raise those prices to the international prices. Cowen 
demonstrates how estate capital as an earlier form extracted value on the basis 
of absolute surplus labor (by lengthening the working day, decreasing consumption, 
and/or paying value) and in doing so invited the pauperization of the producer 
in constrast to international capital (Cowen, 1977). 17 
In Tanzania, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie has used the state as a vehicle 
of accumulation for itself as a class, with inflated salaries and numerous 
perks substituting for their inability to accumulate in the sphere of produc-
tion. Furthermore, as real producer prices decrease relative to inflation, 
the salaries and costs of administering crop-buying parastatals have increased 
over time. The result has been that international capital has tranformed 
the value of labor power with improved inputs at the same time that state 
capital has put a lid on producer prices, with the margin between producer 
and international prices increasing. Coupled with the obvious limitations 
of increasing the extraction of surplus value on small household units, in-
ternational capital has mainly generated increased value for exchange through 
the expansion of the number of households engaged in the production of a par-
ticular commodity, rather than in any genuine transformation in the value of 
18 labor power. While international capital has attempted to pressure for 
higher producer prices in some cash crop commodities, it has simultaneously 
helped to support programs that effectively increase the pressure on the 
19 
small producer. It has also kept the state and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
as a class from experiencing their own reproduction squeeze by injecting large 
amounts of capital and cancelling loans in some cases. Coupled with the 
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obvious limitations of increasing the ratio of necessary relative to surplus 
labor time on small household units, international capital has compensated 
for the contradictions by generating increased value for exchange through the 
expansion of households engaged in the production of a particular commodity 
rather than in any genuine transformation of the value of labor power. In-
ternational capital, then, is like all other capitals faced with the law of 
value as its adversary and with the inherent contradictions of Narodism. 
However, to the extent (and it is in some respects quite considerable) that 
international capital can transform the value of labor power within the con-
fines of household production, it postpones other confrontations 
the confrontation with either indigenous capital or labor. 
in particular, 
Faced with strong big bourgeoisies in various parts of Africa and else-
where in the third world, international capital is finding its sphere of oper-
ations increasingly circumscribed (Swainson, 1977: 39-55). Hence, to the 
extent that production can be organized to simultaneously extract greater 
surplus value and forestall the development of a big bourgeoisie, it does not 
immediately go against the interests of international capital. The expansion 
of household production does this "by tempering rather than accelerating the 
concentration of land within the hands of the indigenous class" and "by 
eclipsing the growth of sources of wage labour power" (Cowen, NCCHP: 13). 
The evident sympathy of international capital should not be surprising given 
its recognition that either organized labor or, more especially, unemployed 
or poor landless people, may be politically destabilizing and hence threaten 
longer term intersts (Feder, 1977: 56-78). In some cases, this has led to 
demands by international capital for "land reform" (Halliday, 1979: 26-27) 
and "redistribution," while in other cases, the existing social formations 
are more hospitable to this advanced Narodism and its international development 
packages of "appropriate technology" and "nonformal education." While at one 
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level these packages stymie the development of capital and the socialization 
of labor, at another they alter the value of labor power and reduce the most 
1 . d. . f N d. 20 g aring contra 1ct1ons o aro ism. 
Tanzania is quite hospitable to Narodism in a certain sense, because 
even prior to the massive reentry of international capital, the material base 
of the ruling class led to its adopting policies which effectively acted both 
to curtail the development of a bourgeoisie and a proletariat and to base 
state accumulation on a landed middle peasantry. However, as Cowen has argued 
in another case, "the preponderance of the middle peasantry has been secured 
by the action of international capital at the economic level ... " (Cowen, NCCHP: 
5; my emphasis). Ironically, then, international capital in Tanzania cannot 
be accused of having turned Tanzania away from its "socialist" path towards 
capitalism. Tanzania had already embarked on the capitalist road. Instead, 
international capital has bolstered the existing petit bourgeois capitalism 
by entering with capital of a different form and period. This has effectively 
worked to further expand household production, and thereby to perpetuate the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie and its efforts to forestall a competitive capitalist 
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class. If international capital is to be correctly accused, it cannot be 
for having created a class of kulaks, but rather for helping to temporarily 
cement Narodism, which Lenin noted "stands for levelling out the peasantry 
and is 'regressive' because it desires to keep capital within those medieval 
forms that combine exploitation with scattered, technically backward production 
and with personal pressure on the producer" (Lenin, I: 485). The fact that 
international capital can to some degree transform the value of labor power 
and rationalize commodity relations (by raising food prices, grain storage 
projects, etc.) does not mean that the middle peasantry can be secured indef-
initely. The middle peasantry is, after all, a fragile petit bourgeois class 
within the confines of capitalism itself. Efforts to solidify the middle 
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peasantry and curtail the extremes of bourgeoisie and proletariat cannot sur-
mount the law of value, which in turn generates contradictions that point to 
the inherent instability of the middle peasantry as a class and the logical 
impossibility of its indefinite perpetuation. Furthermore, in the face of 
developing commodity production, it would be only realistic to view the middle 
peasantry as a trapped proletariat in the face of one mode of production and 
totally inappropriate to see it as a precapitalist formation. This is a con-
tinuation of the arguments put forward by Cowen and Banaji (1977), who maintain 
that where the state subjects household commodity producers to quality and 
quantity controls and supervises their labor, producer prices are equivalent 
to wages and the household producers themselves become wage labor equivalents. 
However, as both Lenin and Marx noted on numerous occasions, there are clear 
and significant differences between a trapped equivalent and labor power 
as a "free" commodity (Capital: I, 169). 
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Notes 
1
see Lenin, DCR, Vols. I-II, IV-VI. 
2
cowen's discussions concerning the expansion of middle peasant household 
production in Kenya and the role of international capital in buttressing this 
expansion critique -- the populist notion that the effect of this interven-
tion is to support accumulation by a domestic bourgeoisie, Although some of 
my findings differ from Cowen's, his writings have been an inspiration. 
3Jn his discussions of Kenya, Cowen argues that international capital enters 
as finance industrial capital with a consequent propensity to extract by rel-
ative surplus value in contrast to the estate merchant capital of a previous 
era which extracted by absolute surplus value, Cowen demonstrates that while 
estate capital sought to maintain producer prices, international capital at-
tempted to raise producer prices as part of a more general attempt to raise the 
value of labor, As such, he maintains in contrast to populist writers, no 
instance of pauperization resulted. Cowen, D.C.; 1977. 
4There is a need for a study of the relationship between the kulaks and 
the bureaucratic class which took over at independence. Since there is little 
solid evidence on this point, one must rest with the generalizations that 
exist at present. 
5
ranganyika was a German colony until the end of WWI, when it became a 
British Protectorate under the League of Nations. How much or whether its 
status as a Protectorate influenced Britain's policy here is an open question. 
6 Clark, pp. 30-34. 
7 Clearly proletarianization was not uniform in Kenya. 
8
rhe nascent big bourgeoisie in Kenya could be said to have been fighting 
the colonial state's Narodism in trying to better indigenous accumulation in 
refusing to give title deeds to the few. 
9
use of the term "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" has been criticized. See Saul, 
von Freyhold, Nabudere. 
lOin many respects, the colonial state could be said to have done the dirty 
work for Kenya's big bourgeoisie. First, it separated the producers from 
the means of production by alienating land. Second, it smashed "Mau Mau" and 
made it impossible for the landless to regain that land. Third, it loaned 
the Kenyan ruling class the money to buy out British settlers and thereby 
gave this class the proper excuse to create a land market and sell the land 
rather than redistribute it to the landless. 
11This is a history that awaits further research, especially that concerning 
the relationship between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the kulaks. 
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12Marx noted, "A greater number of labourers working at the same time (or 
if you will in the same field of labour) in order to produce the same sort 
of commodity under the mastership of one capitalist, constitutes both histor-
ically and logically the starting point of capitalist production,, .. With regard 
to the mode of production itself, manufacture in its strict meaning is hardly 
to be distinguished in its earlier phases from the handicraft trades of the 
guilds other than by the greater number of workmen simultaneously employed 
by one and the same individual capital" (Marx, Capital: I, 322). 
13The food crisis coincided with a drought. However, the legacies of an 
earlier period of Narodism meant that there were no reserves and the process 
of villagization disrupted existing patterns of production. The actual process 
of villagization has been discussed more extensively by Boesen, Coulson, Fort-
mann, Raikes, Tabari, van Freyhold. 
14Prior to 1971, Tanzania had been a "net exporter" of food, Between 1973-
1975, 500,000 tons of maize was imported, foreign exchange reserves were ex-
hausted and the balance of payments deficit increased threefold by 1974 
(Lofchie, pp. 453-55 ). 
15
coulson (1977) has shown that most of the agricultural advice given peasants 
from the colonial period up to the present has been incorrect, including the 
question of whether inputs should be used at all on certain types of land 
and, if so, what types, 
16 The World Bank and the Marketing Research Bureau have pushed for an in-
crease in food prices and devised plans for a grain storage project. A contin-
uous production for exchange can only be assured if the peasantry is not prey 
to famines in the face of natural disasters. Higher producer prices encourage 
the production of food crops for exchange, while storage facilities insure the 
retention of buffer stocks and increase the likehood that over time food com-
modities will be circulated for exchange in the rural areas. 
17
rn Tanzania, one could not argue that pauperization is averted by the 
intervention of international capital. It is true that through its greater 
rationalization and expansion of commodity relations it can attenuate the very 
wrst contradictions of middle peasant household production, including star-
vation; nevertheless, limited to household labor, over work and underconsumption 
are conspicous features of middle peasant household production even following 
this intervention, in part because of the class which controls the state, in 
part because of the inherent contradictions of Narodism both in its backward 
and "advanced" forms. 
18A genuine transformation would involve transforming the productive forces 
beyond improved inputs. 
19For example, the World Bank is supporting the development of a program 
for village management and a number of other interntaional agencies are sup-
porting other programs to "deconcentrate" state authority to the village level 
(Boesen, N.D.) Furthermore, deductions for inputs received on credit remain• 
high and the general approach to recouping credit, both by state and international 
agencie~ is to put more pressure on the producer at the same time that he 
increasingly receives less for what he produces. 
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20
rhe most glaring contradiction is starvation. 
21 As Cowen notes in another case, "It is not the indigenous bourgeoisie 
which has been created by the interventions of international capital. Rather 
that the formation of the indigenous bourgeoisie in the countryside has been 
deflected by phases of expansion of household production where the expansion 
has been directly set in motion by the intervention of international capital 
(Cowen, NCCHP: 2). 
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